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The Third Impeachment Article: Congressional Bootstrapping 
by William Van Alstyne 
Just how elastic a congressional bootstrap is the 
impeachment clause? When Congress failed even 
to ask the courts to sustain its views of its own 
powers against those of the presidency, could it 
nevertheless presume to impeach the president 
for resisting its claim? The question was raised by 
the third article of impeachment voted against former 
President Nixon by the House Judiciary Committee. 
JN ITS THIRD article of impeachment voted in late 
July, the House Judiciary Committee recited its sev-
eral subpoenas that former President Nixon "willfully 
disobeyed" and concluded that he thereby committed an 
impeachable "high crime" or "misdemeanor" because he 
had, under claim of executive privilege, '·interposed the 
powers of the presidency against the lawful subpoenas 
of the House of Representatives." In an editorial on July 
31 the New York Times entered a judgment in agree-
ment with the twenty-one-to-seventeen majority of the 
Judiciary Committee, concluding that it was "to fore-
stall such a situation that the Founding Fathers wrote 
impeachment into the Constitution."' I believe that the 
committee and the Times -were mistaken and that had 
the issue gone to trial in the Senate, history would have 
repeated itself. 
In 1868 Pres. Andrew Johnson knowingly violated an 
act of Congress, the Tenure of Office Act, which Con-
gress also presumed to determine for itself was constitu-
tional, and accordingly the House of Representatives 
impeached the president for his willful defiance of that 
law. Yet, as Benjamin Curtis, former associate justice, 
observed in defense of Andrew Johnson, it was far from 
clear as to who was right, Congress or president, in re-
spect to the contested constitutionality of that law. 
The president, believing that Congress had no author-
ity to restrict his power to remove a cabinet officer, in 
this instance Secretary of War Stanton, as he, the presi-
dent, should alone see fit to do, had acted in accordance 
with his belief. Johnson thereby precipitated a "case or 
controversy" the courts might have determined against 
him had Stanton filed suit to regain his office, and John-
son would have been bound to yield to the authority 
of the courts to decide. Congress, however, believing the 
law to be valid but unwilling to have that determined in 
court, presumed to find the president mistaken in his 
own opinion and appeared bent on construing the im-
peachment power as a proper means of granting Con-
gress the right to prefer its own view of the Constitution 
to any different view the president might maintain. 
Curtis argued passionately before the Senate that 
plainly the impeachment clause did not license Congress 
to adjudicate its own claims against those of the presi-
dent, for that would mean that the constitutional powers 
of the president would always be only what Congress 
itself would be willing to admit. Rather, referring to 
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 
he observed that it was "emphatically the province and 
duty of the judiciary to say what the law is," once issue 
was joined in a proper case by the willingrress of one 
party or another to act upon his own belief and thereby 
to bring himself within judicial jeopardy, should the 
other party wish to press the matter. 
It is not clear, of course, whether it was this argument 
that resulted in Andrew Johnson's acquittal in the Senate 
by a single vote, but this much is clear: there is no 
precedent or authority whatever, and most certainly no 
hint of suggestion in any of the original debates ac-
companying the proposal of the impeachment clause in 
1787 or its ratification in 1789, that it was meant to 
repose the power in Congress to determine with finality 
the extent of its own power when in conflict with a 
claim of power by the president. The wrongfulness of 
allowing Congress to bring within the ambit of impeach-
ment-"treason, bribery, or other high crimes and mis-
demeanors"-a good faith assertion by the president 
explicitly disputing in a straightforwanl way the constitu-
tionality of a claimed congressional power should be 
apparent to anyone. 
Tt is quite true that Mr. Nixon had previously asserted 
claims of presidential authority that many (myself in-
cluded) believed to be without constitutional merit. He 
did so in authorizing wiretaps without benefit of judicial 
warrant, on grounds of his own prerogative as president, 
solely in the interest of "domestic security." He did so 
in presuming to impound funds that Congress had di-
rected to be spent. He did so in declining to honor the 
subpoena of the special prosecutor for sixty-four addi-
tional tapes the special prosecutor deemed essential 
evidence in specific criminal trials. 
But in none of these instances was Mr. Nixon im-
peached. In each a party adversely affected by the presi-
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dent's action directly challenged his authority through 
the courts, asking only that the judiciary do its duty "to 
say what the law is." In each the challenging party suc-
ceeded. In each President Nixon yielded to judicial or-
der, as he did after the Supreme Court's decision in 
United States v. Nixon, 94 S.Ct. 3090 ( 197 4). 
We have no reason to suppose that he would have 
done otherwise had the House Judiciary Committee 
similarly sought to press its own subpoenas successfully 
in court. The fact that the former president declined to 
test his own claim by appealing to the judiciary to sus-
tain him cannot excuse the committee's making the 
same choice. The reluctance of each to initiate a litiga-
tive test against the other is certainly no high crime or 
misdemeanor. 
A Great Deal Is a Matter of Inference 
Necessarily, for it is scarcely ever otherwise in more 
ordinary criminal cases, a great deal is ultimately a mat-
ter of inference. It was, as one member of the committee 
observed, the arduous process of working with bits and 
pieces of a mosaic, arranging them with no bias or favor 
but as conscientiously as one can in the context of time 
and place, being willing, however, to face up to what-
ever image one may be compelled to recognize. 
But all this is perfectly obvious, except insofar as it 
tends to explain and to provide reason for the sheer 
breadth of the evidence the' committee would have been 
entitled to have considered in support of its charge. Acts 
in themselves readily explainable by a wide variety of · 
motives may lose their presumption of innocence when 
juxtapo5ed with many other acts. And the inexplicable 
and continued refusal of President Nixon to assist the 
Judiciary Committee in its authorized inquiry was not 
equally inexplicable in the totality of circumstances. 
Among these circumstances was not merely the balance 
of the evidence which tended in some measure to as-
sociate Mr. Nixon in the complicities of concealment 
but also the remarkable attachment he had to the items 
subpoenaed by the committee and withheld under claim 
of executive privilege. 
Merits of President's Claim Vanished 
It was not only that it "looked bad" to the public, but 
it looked even worse to the constitutional lawyer. The 
merits of the president's claim were not only thin in the 
overwhelming view of those who wrote professionally 
about the subject, but it was difficult to believe that they 
were honestly felt by counsel whose advice the president 
may (or may not) have sought. As poor as they ap-
peared in June, they shrank to the vanishing point fol-
lowing the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. 
Nixon. The Court appropriately disavowed any expres-
sion about any case other than the one it had to decide, 
but it requires no extravagances of analogical reasoning 
to appreciate the manner in which the Court's decision 
further diminished the little credibility the merits of the 
Nixon claim may have had against the impeachment 
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discovery powers of the House. 
With appropriate caution, the committee was entitled 
to consider the circumstances of the president's claim as 
they might bear on overcoming the presumption of good 
faith and innocence. The manner in which this "abso-
lute" claim was asserted against the Judiciary Commit-
tee, the circumstances of assertion, and the persistence 
of assertion in the face of every other development 
(including the Supreme Court decision) rendered it an 
additional datum in the over-all assessment of obstruc-
tion of the due administration of justice. It was entirely 
appropriate for Representative Daniels to move to 
amend tl1e proposed first arlick of irnpeadunent tu in-
clude resistance to committee processes a<> one of the 
modes according to which it was alleged that the presi-
dent participated in the obstruction of justice. 
This treatment of the claim of absolute executive 
privilege, however, would have imposed a different bur-
den on the House managers in a Senate trial than the 
utter nonburden they would have under the third pro-
posed article. Under the first article, the managers would 
have assumed the burden of satisfying the Senate that 
the claim of absolute executive privilege was not made 
or persisted in in good faith. Rather, they would have 
undertaken to show that, taking everything into account, 
the making or continuation of the claim itself was but 
an additional means of coverup. 
They may have failed, of course, but that is the risk 
the impeachment clause requires in order that the presi-
dent not be removed except for "high crimes" or "mis-
demeanors." Almost certainly the impeachment trial of 
Andrew Johnson would have failed by a far wider mar-
gin than it did had the House managers been made to 
show that Johnson's claim of right to remove a cabinet 
officer without approval by the Senate, contrary to the 
Tenure of Office Act, was not a good faith assertion of 
his belief that the Tenure Act was itself unconstitutional, 
but rather that it was a disguise to conceal or to cover 
up some reprehensible acts of his own or of others. 
Third Article Was Constitutionally Unsound 
Because the Nixon third article of impeachment plied 
a wholly diffe.rent theory, however-that the claim of 
executive privilege is per se a "high crime" or "mis-
demeanor" when opposed by a House committee sub-
poena issued pursuant to the impeachment power-it 
was constitutionally unsound. 
There is another possible defense to the third article 
that might have been raised. It would go like this. After 
we have argued up one side and down the other, isn't 
it plain enough, even to lawyers (most of all to law-
yers?), that the president's claim of privilege against the 
impeachment subpoena power was so utterly absurd on 
its face that, even had the president himself "really" 
believed in it, there could have been no lasting harm in 
impeaching him anyway. After all, the precedent 
that might have been set would itself be such a little 
one, in fact so slight a precedent that we would all be 
ready to distinguish it in almost every other situation. 
All that it would mean is that when virtually everyone 
is in agreement that a president's claim of constitutional 
privilege is manifestly in error, even though honestly 
held, he can be impeached and removed. It would be 
all right, wouldn't it, if we also all agreed that it was 
clearly in the national interest to do so? 
Question of Justiciability Has Not Been Tested 
Several persons who supported tho third article of 
impeachment, trusting to the very eminent authority of 
constitutional scholars, attempted to distinguish the is-
sue in Andrew Johnson's case. In their opinion, had 
either President Nixon or the committee gone to court, 
even to the Supreme Court, the court would have de-
clined outright "to say what the law is," that is, to de-
termine whether the House subpoena power pursuant 
to the impeachment clause is superior to· any claim, 
much less a blanket claim, of executive privilege. They 
say the court instead would have characterized the dis-
pute as "nonjusticiable," a purely political controversy 
that the federal courts either are not empowered to de-
cide at all or, if technically within the judicial power as 
a "case or controversy" arising under the "laws" or the 
"Constitution" as described in Article HI, at least one 
highly inappropriate for decision. 
This opinion has a great deal to be said for itself. It 
is true and importantly so, however, that the Supreme 
Court has in fact never passed on the justiciability of 
the impeachment subpoena power. Thus, it is nothing 
more than an informed opinion that we deal with here, 
as the question of justiciability has itself not been tested. 
Judicial Determination of Distinction Is Missing 
What, then, does the proposition amount to? Essen-
tially, simply this: that whenever Congress persuades 
itself that the courts would decline to pass on a consti-
tutional question in issue between itself and the president 
of the United States, Congress may then presume to 
resolve the issue in its own favor and to impeach the 
president for the "high crime or misdemeanor" of hold-
ing a different view. r do not see how this really dis-
tinguishes Andrew Johnson's case or Benjamin Curtis's 
concern at all. 
What is obviously missing is precisely the. judicial 
determination of the distinction being relied on. If the 
House Judiciary Committee had sought to enforce its 
subpoenas through the courts, and if the courts had then 
declared that it was a matter for the House itself to 
decide (as it might, by a holding that the language in 
Article I, that the House "shall have the sole Power of 
Impeachment," somehow means that the House shall 
also be the sole judge of its subpoena power when used 
in an impeachment inquiry), that would have settled the 
matter. The judiciary having done its duty "to say what 
the law is"-that according to the law of the Constitu-
tion the House is made the final judge of its own im-
peachment subpoena powers-the House would not be 
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wrong to act, and to impvach the president if he still 
continued to defy its process. 
But assume that the courts did even less than this. 
Assume, rather, that the Supreme Court held only the 
question was "nonjusticiable" in the true sense of mean-
ing only that the courts would not themselves presume 
to say anything at all about it, rather than holding as a 
matter of law that it was a question which the Constitu-
tion had committed to the sole determination of the 
House. That too would make a difference, because' it 
would make clear that the House would have no choice 
except to make up its own mind because the judiciary, 
for whate.ver reason, declined "to say what the law is." 
But neither of these happened. The Judiciary Com-
mittee, rather than seeking to determine whether the 
courts would decide the issue, presumed to decide for 
itself the "nonjusticiability" of the constitutional ques-
tion. This device readily lends itself to an infinite regress. 
What other questions of constitutional conflict might 
Congress simply declare to be "nonjusticiable" and by 
so declaring use its impeachment power to have its way, 
deciding every question in its own favor and threaten-
ing impeachment of those who "defy" what Congress 
alone has declared to be the "the law"? We come back 
to the same point. Neither the constitutionality of the 
House impeachment subpoena power nor even the jus-
ticiability of the question was adjudicated when opposed 
by a claim of executive privilege. Assuming only that the 
claim of privilege were asserted in good but mistaken 
faith, how can the mere obstinacy of assertion safely or 
fairly be described as a "high crime" or "misdemeanor"? 
There is but one way in which this could have been 
done-indeed, it was done in the first article of im-
peachment voted against former President Nixon. In 
fact, it was precisely because the first article treated this 
issue in an entirely proper way that the third article was 
so clearly improper. 
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The first article alleged, as a "high crime" or "mis-
demeanor," a course of conduct by the president to im-
pede, delay, interlere with, and obstruct the due adminis-
tration of justice. There is no serious question whatever 
that this charge was well within the core of the im-
peachment clause. Insofar as the committee was not 
obstructed by Mr. Nixon's extraordinary claims of ab-
solute executive privilege, the committee had developed 
a substantial case. Most of that case involved cumulative 
evidence reviewed by the committee over a period of 
several months, briefly profiled in the week of televised 
hearings, and ultimately drawn from the thirty-eight vol-
umes of material the Judiciary Committee had already 
published. 
Some of the material was soft and circumstantial; 
some direct and damning. All of it warranted the com-
mittee's fair consideration, however, precisely because 
much of the basic charge went not only to what Presi-
dent Nixon knew or should have known by even the 
moot minimal reasonable superintendence of his moot 
intimate subordinates, but why he did or failed to do a 
great number of things. 
Just how far are we willing to carry this fetish that 
Congress ought not to presume to be the sole judge of 
just what is an impeachable offense? What if, to use an 
example found in the original Watergate hearings, Presi-
dent Nixon personally ordered the, ransacking of Dr. 
Fielding's office or even the murder of Dr. Fielding, but 
did so claiming that he thought "national security" re-
quired it? Should one contend that unless Congress were 
to find that the president was not acting in good faith, 
that is, in the good faith belief that he did have the 
constitutional authority even to direct homicide for rca-
sons of national security, it could not impeach and 
remove him---or at least not do so unless some cou.rt 
first declared that the question of privilege was "non-
justiciable"? 
Dubious Premises Furnished False Support 
But this last example mistakes the whole purpose of 
this essay. I have not attempted to argue that only the 
courts can presume to say what is a "high crime" or 
"misdemeanor." Rather, I assume that of course Con-
gress may determine this to its own satisfaction, and in 
moot instances no one would even consider asking the 
courts to review the sufficiency of the grounds, even 
assuming that any court would agree to do so. Indeed, 
I raise no criticism of the other articles of impeachment 
precisely because I do not think anyone could seriously 
doubt that they alleged "high crimes" or "misdemeanors" 
or that conviction and removal on the grounds stated in 
those articles would set a bad precedent. 
But the third article was objectionable precisely be-. 
cause is was not like the other two. May one not finally 
test the proposition this way? Suppose that the third 
article were made to stand by itself by removing the 
support it derived from the other articles. This is not 
an unfair way of examining it, as we understand that 
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conviction in the Senate vn any article would have re-
sulted in the president's removal and that proof of this 
"offense" was already clear-the president did fail to 
comply with the subpoenas-where sufficient proof on 
the other two articles was more doubtful. 
How, then, shall we rationalize the outcome? That 
"just like" executively directed homicide under a good 
faith claim of constitutional privilege, it was so abun-
dantly clear that default on the committee's subpoenas 
even under a good faith claim of constitutional privilege 
was so obviously culpable, so plainly corrupt, so un-
arguably a "high crime" or "misdemeanor" that we 
would see no harm done by this construction of the 
Constitution? 
May someone not inquire, at least at some future date, 
that if Congress were so confident of its premises why, 
at least, did it not first attempt to remove the doubt by 
a willingness to test the strength or even the justiciabil-
ity of its subpoena power against that claim of privilege 
through the judicial process? Would it, truly, have dimin-
ished Congress in the public's view, or might not that 
willingness on Congress's part have been exactly what 
was demanded in the era that was Watergate? 
The first two articles of impeachment were powerlul 
and correct. They needed 110 false support from the 
highly dubious premises of the third. .A. 
Cost Accounting Standards Workshop 
THE Section of Public Contract Law and the National 
Contract Management Association are cosponsoring 
a two-day workshop on cost accounting standards whicl: 
will be held at the Shoreham Hotel in Washington, D.C., 
on Thursday and Friday, October 31 and November 1, 
1974. 
The, first morning will feature a number of prominent 
speakers. After lunch, the registrants will be divided 
into groups of twenty to twenty-five participants. Each 
group will have a moderator and a panel consisting of 
a member of the cost accounting standards board staff, 
a government contract auditor, and a government con-
tracts representative. An attempt will be made to organ-
ize the groups to accommodate different degrees of in-
volvement with the cost accounting standards. Discussion 
will focus on practical solutions to everyday problem~. 
The second morning will continue the group discus-
sions. After lunch selected panelists will summarize the 
main issues discussed in the groups, and a question-
answer session will follow. 
Further information may be obtained from the Divi-
sion of Legal Practice and Education, American Bar 
Association, 1155 East Sixtieth Street, Chicago, Illinois 
6063 7, or the National Contract Management Associa-
tion, 2001 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Vir-
ginia 22202. 
